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(More customer reviews)MARSHALL'S DECEPTION
(Compiled by Tom Kimmel)
The following account of General Marshall's three appearances as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) is excerpted and quoted entirely from General Henry Russell's 160 page book, Pearl Harbor Story, which he wrote in 1944 and 1945, but did not publish. His heirs recognized its importance and published it in 2001. It is a remarkable firsthand account of how the APHB stumbled across the truth of the Pearl Harbor story, tried to ignore it, but could not. General Russell was a member of the APHB, along with its President General George Grunert, and General Walter Frank. The entirety of General Russell's book is strongly recommended for anyone interested in national defense, leadership, investigations, or the rule of law. This account explains why.
The APHB Prepares for Marshall's First Appearance as a Witness
"My chief interest centered in the testimony of General Marshall, as the responsible head of the War Department. To my disappointment I discovered that such testimony as he gave [to the Roberts Commission in 1941] had been omitted from the record. There was a brief statement that General Marshall had appeared before the Board [referring here to the Roberts Commission] and had described certain operations of the War Department; that these operations were of such secret nature that the Commission had felt justified in omitting them from its record. I must admit that I read this with some suspicions. General Marshall's technique in his appearance before public boards, particularly Congressional committees, was well known to me, and I have heard others refer to it. In advance he acquaints himself with what such bodies may desire and determines what he is willing to tell them. When he appears before the group, he immediately launches into a discussion of the subject and relies on his great powers of salesmanship to overwhelm the body to which he is talking. Ordinarily when he has finished with his discussion those to whom he was talking are overcome and excuse him. For the lack of a better term, we might describe this technique as the `Congressional Brush-off.'[pp.34-35]. . . .
"In the examination of General Marshall and a few others we were handicapped by General Grunert's directive that all questions be written and submitted to them well in advance of their appearance to testify. Every trial lawyer knows the value [of] being able to examine witnesses without notifying them in advance of the information sought. There is no time to think about the answers to be given or the effect of such answers on the witness making them. In the case of General Marshall the advantages of impromptu examination may have been unimportant. He is a very intelligent and skillful witness. This, coupled with the fact that he was the Chief of Staff of the Army and, replying to officers of his command, permitted him to get into the record such facts as he desired the Board to have. Occasionally, when faced with direct questions from which he could not escape, he made direct answers. Generally he was very evasive.
"I prepared a memorandum describing the procedure we would follow when Marshall was called, and setting forth the questions that we wanted him to answer. This memorandum was sent to Marshall's office, and a day was agreed upon when the Board, with its assistants, would go to that office to take the testimony.
Marshall's First Appearance as a Witness before the APHB
"On the appointed day a small automobile caravan. . . went to the General's office. Since I had been designated to investigate the War Department, it became my duty to examine Marshall. I had outlined very clearly the things that the Board wanted to know from him. The most important information desired was what he knew about the intentions and plans of the Japanese in the fall of 1941 and what part of this information he passed on to Short [General Walter S. Short, the head of the Army's Hawaiian Command]. . . . After some preliminaries in which the Board and General Marshall passed pleasantries, General Grunert announced that I would conduct the examination. I began by asking questions relating to what Marshall knew about Japanese plans and intentions, referring to the growing tensity in our relations with the Japanese Empire during the fall of 1941. As I now recall, I had asked one or two questions about relations between the War and State Departments when Marshall appeared somewhat vexed by my line of questioning and manifested some signs of irritation at me. In all events, he requested that every one leave the room with the exception of the three members of the Board, a Brig. Gen. Nelson, who was apparently an assistant to Marshall, and McNarney, remained in the room also.
"Alone with the Board, Marshall related to us what he described as information, almost too secret for him to talk about. It dealt with the breaking of the Japanese code. Dramatically, Marshall described the transcending value of the information that was being obtained as a result of deciphering Japanese messages.
"I am not certain about the effect of Marshall's statement on the other members of the Board. I must admit that I was under his spell. I was very greatly impressed with his descriptions of the importance of maintaining the highest secrecy about our breaking the Japanese code.
"I waited with much interest, nevertheless, for him to tell us what the War Department had discovered about Japanese plans and intentions in 1941 by virtue of having access to Japanese diplomatic exchanges. In this field we were greatly disappointed. Marshall used a lot of words, but said little. He discussed a day. This day was a sort of roving day, very indefinite. It moved around in November and finally passed over into December. Something was going to happen on that day. This something would be produced by Japanese activity. What it was, Marshall never said. I remember asking him on two occasions if it was true that the War Department knew that the Japanese were thinking about some day late in November or early December, but did not know the exact significance of that day. Each time Marshall replied that it was true. The picture of Marshall during his secret conference with members of the Board remains entirely clear in my mind. He was a most impressive figure. Words came to him with great readiness. He spoke with a most intense earnestness. I had always regarded Marshall as a very intellectual man. On this day Marshall, the super-salesman, was at his magnificent best.
"When he had finished his discussion he sent for the reporters and assistants. When they returned, with an air of finality, he wanted to know if he could be of further help to the Board. In the interim while the Board was reassembling, I recovered from the spell of Marshall's speech and was now back out of the stratosphere and in the Pentagon. I realized that the two main questions that the Board wanted to ask Marshall had not been answered. I remained curious about Marshall's knowledge of Japanese plans and intentions in 1941, and what he had passed on to Short. [pp.46-48]. . . .
"When he had finished the major portion of the examination I realized that we had made little progress in determining what Marshall knew about the Japanese plans and intentions in the late fall of 1941. So far as the evidence developed disclosed, he had told Short practically nothing. The nature of the examination had been such as to require a complete disclosure of everything that Marshall had sent Short. [p.50]. . . .
"I then turned to an examination of Marshall about the [`War-Warning'] message of November 27 (472) and Short's reply thereto. I do not recall that he described his relation to 472. He was very hazy about having seen Short's sabotage reply. . . . It was his assumption that he had seen the Short reply. He stated that whether he saw the Short reply or not, his responsibility in connection with it could not be escaped.
"In referring to questions about the form and substance of 472, he made the tremendously important statement that we will stand on the record as written. He realized then that he was on the defensive. He did not wish to discuss the probable effect of the limitations and restrictions in 472 on Short's thinking.
"Toward the end of the examination, General Marshall lost interest in it. He began to watch the clock rather regularly and stated that he had some meeting which he was forced to attend. It was with important representatives of foreign countries.
"When we left his office, I realized that the `brush-off' technique had been applied; that a great part of the time had been consumed by Marshall in reading meaningless correspondence, and all for a purpose. [p.51]. . . .
"As a witness, Short was the exact opposite of Marshall. Both men have very keen intellects and quick minds. Marshall had employed his to evade direct questions and to give the Board only such information as he wanted it to have. Short testified readily [p.64]. . . .
"Why Marshall went as far as he did without telling the Board the entire truth remains a mystery. [p.93]. . . .
"Intercepted Japanese messages had been withheld from the Board by the War Department and I could see but one reason, to wit: Marshall and his close associates on the General Staff did not want the Army Pearl Harbor Board to know that they were in possession of so much important information, none of which had been sent to Short on the Islands. [p.98]. . . .
Marshall's Second Appearance as a Witness before the APHB
"The reappearance of General Marshall before the Board as a witness resulted from testimony given by Admiral Kimmel [the...Read more›
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In 1944 Major-General Henry Dozier Russell was appointed to the United States Army Pearl Harbor Investigation Board. Their assignment was to discover how the attack on Pearl Harbor could have taken place without US knowledge. The results of that investigation are widely known. And while the Board's conclusions fell most harshly on General George C. Marshall, there were many others who would share responsiblity in this infamous event.Written between 1944 and 1946 and stored in a vault until the mid-1990's, this memoir reveals Russell's thoughts, concerns, and unique perspective on one of the darkest moments in US history: the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.Quotes from the Memoir:"I doubt if at any critical time in our history our interests were in the hands of a weaker group of men than those constituting the War Department in December 1941.""The conduct of the War Department from the evening of December 6, 1941, until the time of the attack reflects a state of inefficiency which is so amazing that its description would not be believed were it not so completely established.""We knew early Sunday morning that war would come at one o'clock that day, but nothing was done. The War Department was enjoying its weekend of leisure and this could not be distrubed by a little Japanese war. What a sorry picture!"
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