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(More customer reviews)Napoleon is quoted as having said, "History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon." Bill Bartsch's engaging and readable book covers an historic event that has received only limited scholarly attention in the years following WWII and thus far no"agreement" exists about it. Even the attack on Pearl Harbor, which has been exhaustively examined, continues to generate controversy. In taking up this story, the reader has no settled version or consensus to which to refer. In effect, the story is being told for the first time.
Bartsch has broken new ground in telling this story and presents a fascinating and dynamic history told in a well-paced narrative. He has taken on the long overdue task of presenting a compelling and sad history of bravery, incompetence and competing egos combined with a war planning system that was still evolving when America entered WWII. In its failure to fully understand the inexorable growth of hostilities in both the east and west, America was suffering from a perceptual lag during the pre-WWII period. The national mood during the 1930s, shaped by the economic traumas of the Depression and memories of WWI, adamantly opposed involvement in foreign wars. This mood was reflected in the country's foreign and fiscal policies. Military budgets were kept unreasonably low, military planning was based on defensive, not offensive, strategies and technological development was morbidly slow. Operating as an arm of the Army, the Army Air Corps was at an even greater disadvantage in both resources and status. In spite of the debacle that Bartsch describes in the Philippines, it's amazing to look back now and to appreciate the decisive role airpower played in helping to win WWII. Especially when considered in light of the events on Dec. 8, 1941.
Among the book's many strengths is the way Bartsch has constructed this story: to the extent possible, from the point of view of the participants themselves. By skillfully integrating the experiences of both American and Japanese combatants in the run-up to the Japanese attack, Bartsch is not being morally neutral, but rather providing readers the means to fully appreciate this dynamic piece of history through the insights and perceptions of everyone from high-level strategist to individual officers and enlisted men as each side prepared for war.
The history revealed in this book, and the tragic event at its center, must inevitably lead to questions of responsibility. Bartsch goes back to the period just before the war to begin his story. The record of this period may still be in dispute, but there is general agreement that Washington political and military planners were hampered in their work by a profoundly inadequate appreciation for the power of the Japanese war machine and an overly optimistic perception of U.S. military superiority. Moreover, their focus was on Europe, German aggression and how to support Britain at a time when domestic political forces favored neutrality.
The Pacific was an afterthought in this context, and when Washington finally understood the scope of the Japanese threat it was a case of too little too late. Air Corps and Army material in the Philippines was decidedly outdated; clearly inadequate for use against a well equipped foe. Yet, with its focus on Europe, Washington continually deflected urgent requests, until what - from this perspective - looks like the last minute. Washington planners also misunderstood the nature of the Japanese threat which had an adverse effect on their decisions in the type of aircraft they supplied.
Brought out of retirement to head U.S. forces in the Far East, Douglas MacArthur no doubt brought with him old assumptions about warfare in general and airpower in particular. However, he did recognize the need to build-up and improve the Air Corps and early warning systems there which prompted MacArthur to replace the Air Corps commander, Gen Henry Clagett with Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. MacArthur felt that Brereton was the better man to lead the build-up and to manage the logistical demands that would be required. Supplies finally began to flow to the Philippines as the Japanese threat grew more palpable. Plans began in earnest to deploy resources, improve early warning systems, air bases and generally mount a defense of the Philippines against the increasing likelihood of Japanese aggression.
Bartsch goes to great detail to document Washington's repeated warnings to MacArthur and Brereton that Japan was on a war footing. Indeed, Bartsch also records their response and the range of active preparations in anticipation of conflict. There was a disconnect somewhere in all of the planning. Though MacArthur and Brereton had a full day after the attack on Pearl Harbor to prepare a response to the very high probability of a Japanese attack on the Philippines, and though the outlying fighter and bomber groups were all on alert, when the attack finally occurred the Air Corps and most of the other military units there were caught off guard.
Bartsch tells the dramatic story of that day from both American and Japanese viewpoints. He provides graphic details of the tragedy on the ground for those airmen and airplanes caught in the sights of Japanese attackers. He describes the heroism of those pilots who were able to take off and bravely faced the overwhelming odds.
Bartsch is a good writer. He has the rare ability to establish an aura of suspense about an event in which the outcome is already known. He is also an historian, and it is important that out of this recording of events, the reader gain some insight about what happened and how it went wrong. His extensive research provides a reliable foundation for an assessment of the failures of command and control in both Washington and the Philippines that ultimately caused not only the destruction of U.S. military capacity in the Philippines but also the loss of America's prime strategic outpost in the Pacific. Without the Philippines, America's ability to resist Japanese aggression was so badly crippled that it would take another year to begin turning back Japanese advances in the Southwest Pacific and East Asia.
This is a powerful story, well told and well researched. It's also an important moment in American history about which Americans know too little. Bill Bartsch has done a remarkable job in telling that story and reminding us that we have much to be proud of but there is also much to learn from our own history.
Click Here to see more reviews about: December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor (Texas A&M University Military History Series, 87.)
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