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(More customer reviews)The epic duel in the Pacific Ocean in 1942 between the carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Kido Butai (Mobile Force) and the carriers of the United States Navy makes for dramatic history and this story is told with great verve and insight by Commander (ret.) Mark Stille. USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers is the sixth volume in Osprey's new Duel series and readers need not fear that this is a repackaging of material from other Campaign and New Vanguard series titles. Rather, this volume provides a fresh look at four carrier vs. carrier battles (Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz) in 1942, fought when the odds were fairly even and in the context of two rival weapon systems. Both the graphics and text were highly engaging and I would strongly recommend this volume for readers interested in the Second World War in the Pacific.
The initial section on design and development focuses on carrier doctrine, carrier design and carrier construction programs for both the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Herein, the author notes that the U.S. carriers were aided by earlier introduction of air-search radar, heavier anti-aircraft armament, better damage control and larger air wings. On the other hand, the Japanese opted for smaller aircraft with longer range, but otherwise the author views their carriers as generally inferior technically to their main U.S. counterparts. Color plan forms of the USS Enterprise and the IJN Zuikaku are included. The Strategic Situation section outlines the U.S. Navy's vulnerabilities after Pearl Harbor and the effort to mass a sufficient number of carriers to oppose the Kido Butai at a favorable moment. In the technical specifications section, the author details the U.S. Lexington and Yorktown class carriers, as well as the F-4F Wildcat fighter, the SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bomber, the TBD-1 Devastator and TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers for the U.S.N., and the 6 fleet and 4 light carriers for the IJN.
The well-written section on combatants discusses each sides' command personnel, naval aviators and anti-aircraft gunnery. Here the author notes that the U.S.N. was actually more selective in pre-war pilot training than the IJN, which found 90 percent of its aircrew from the enlisted ranks. Only 22 percent of U.S. naval aviators in 1942 had more than two year's flying experience. The author provides full-page plates on Vice-Admiral Nagumo and Rear-Admiral Fletcher, and a half-page each on aviators Lieutenant Richard Best (Dauntless pilot from USS Enterprise who bombed Akagi at Midway) and Lieutenant Tomonaga Joichi (Kate pilot from Hiryu who almost torpedoed Yorktown).
The 18-page section on combat sequentially covers the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Although the Japanese made costly mistakes in the first two battles, he notes that they increased the size of their fighter wings and added radar to their carriers, which enhanced their performance in the last two battles. This section also has a color battle scene, depicting Ensign George Gay floating in the water, watching the destruction of Akagi, Kaga and Soryu. The real meat in this volume is the 5-page section on statistics and analysis, which lays out the results of these four battles. While Midway was a clear U.S. victory and Eastern Solomons was a draw, the author views Coral Sea and Santa Cruz as costly Japanese tactical victories. He notes that of the 6 U.S. carriers committed in the Pacific in 1942, 4 were sunk, versus 6 of 10 for the Japanese (plus nearly every one of the survivors was damaged in 1942 - a tough year on carriers). The author makes several key points: (a) the Japanese had superior offensive anti-ship capabilities based upon their superior Type 91 air-launched torpedo -"in every 1942 battle, once an American carrier was torpedoed, it was eventually sunk," (b) the USN had persistent problems coordinating multi-carrier air group attacks in 1942 and Midway was the lucky exception, (c) the Japanese improved their air-search techniques after Midway and were not surprised again and (d) the U.S. continued operating single-carrier task forces throughout 1942 - which weakened their offensive and defensive capabilities - but was gradually moving toward multi-carrier task forces. The author concludes that both sides learned a great deal from these four carrier battles, but only the USN had the resources to build and train large carrier strike groups. Japan struggled to replace its losses from 1942, but was forced to convert merchant ships into carriers and its pilot training program could only produce a trickle of trained pilots. On the other hand, the U.S. mass-produced both the excellent Essex-class carriers and thousands of new pilots. The result was that the one carrier battle after 1942 - the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 - was a decisive victory for the USN, which finally resolved the carrier vs. carrier duel for control of the Pacific.
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The Imperial Japanese Navy was a pioneer in naval aviation, having commissioned the world's first carrier, which was used against the US fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Americans followed suit, initiating huge aircraft carrier development programs. As the Pacific war escalated into the largest naval conflict in history, the role of the carrier became the linchpin of American and Japanese naval strategy as these rival vessels found themselves locked in a struggle for dominance of this critical theater of war. This book provides an analysis of the variety of weaponry available to the rival carriers, including the powerful shipborne guns and embarked aircraft.Study the design and development of these revolutionary ships, discover the pioneering tactics that were used to ensure victory and "live" the experiences of the rival airmen and gun crews as they battled for victory in a duel of skill, tenacity and guts.
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