Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3d Edition Review

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(More customer reviews)Silent Warfare is probably the best introductory text available covering the subject of intelligence. It reads like a text book, but that's because it basically IS a textbook. It's a serious academic text rather than a cloak and dagger story. This is one to read for understanding rather than necessarily for pleasure.
The book is fairly short but covers all the bases in terms of types of intelligence, types of intelligence organisation, the various debates surrounding the subject etc. It is, perhaps inevitably, somewhat America-centric. British intelligence and the KGB stick their heads into the picture from time to time, largely to provide illustrative comparisons rather than as studies in themselves.
When making a point, the authors generally try to provide historical examples and comparison, which is helpful, especially for the beginner. It also helps to enliven the text a bit.
The book is extremely well sourced and many of the end notes contain further explanations and are extremely interesting in themselves.
The only thing I feel the book lacks, and this is a fairly minor quibble, is a bibliography. This would have been very useful, especially in what is intended to be an introductory textbook. A bibliographical essay with suggestions for recommended further reading would have been even better.
Quibbles aside, this is a very good primer and to the best of my knowledge there are no books on the market that can compete with it in terms of providing a solid academic introduction to the subject. People with a serious interest in intelligence would be well advised to follow this book up by taking a look at the works of Michael Herman, which provide more in-depth coverage (especially "Intelligence Power in Peace and War") and a non-American (in this case British) angle - though they may be a little heavy for the absolute novice.
To sum up, if you have never read an academic book on intelligence before this is the one to go for.

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Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage Review

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Intelligence professionals will be very disappointed by this book, citizens interested in Presidential approaches to intelligence, somewhat less so. The author's brilliant biography of William Casey, OSS Veteran and Director of Central Intelligence under President Ronald Reagan, was a much more satisfying book. What we have here is by and large a mish-mash of the works of others, together with an original composition on FDR's involvement in intelligence that is uneven--partly because the subject did not put much in writing, and partly because the author chose to rely primarily on secondary published sources.
From the perspective of one interested in "Presidential intelligence," that is, how does a President manage various means of keeping informed, the book is a must read but also a shallow read. We learn that FDR was a master of deception and of running many parallel efforts, balancing them against one another. We learn that FDR was remarkably tolerant of amateurism and incompetence, while good at finding the gems these same loose but prolific intelligence endeavors could offer.
Perhaps most importantly, we gain some insights into how Presidents, even when properly informed by intelligence (e.g. of Pearl Harbor in advance, or of the lack of threat from domestic Americans of Japanese descent) must yet "go along" and provide either inaction pending the public's "getting it", or unnecessary action (the internments) to assuage public concern.
There are enough tid-bits to warrant a full reading of the book, but only for those who have not read widely in the literature of intelligence and/or presidential history. The British lied to the President and grossly exaggerated their intelligence capabilities, in one instance presenting a man "just back from behind the lines" when in fact he was simply on staff and lying for effect. We learn that the Department of State was twice offered, and twice declined, the lead on a global structure for collecting and processing intelligence. We learn that FDR himself concluded that Croatia and Serbia would never ever get along and should be separate countries.
On the NATO side, we learn that Eisenhower went with bad weather and the invasion succeeded in part because of a successful deception and in part because of Ike's courage in going forward in the face of bad weather--fast forward to how weather incapacitates our high-technology today. Most interestingly, we learn that FDR finally approved Eisenhower as leader of Overload, in lieu of his favorite, General Marshall, in part because he recognized that the allied joint environment required a general and a politician in one man.
This book is a hybrid, attempting to mesh presidential history with intelligence history, and perhaps this should gain the author some margin of tolerance. Unfortunately, in focusing on the relationships among the various intelligence principals and the president, he seriously passes over the enormous contributions of military as well as civilian and allied intelligence to the larger undertaking, and one is left with the narrow impression that American intelligence consisted largely of a number of self-serving clowns vying for Presidential favor.
The flaws inherent in a Federal Bureau of Investigation dominated by J. Edgar Hoover, and the lack of cooperation between the FBI and other major intelligence activities that continues today, are noted throughout the book.
Bottom line: worth buying and reading to gain insight into the challenges facing a President who can become isolated from reality by a corporate staff, but nowhere near the quality of Christopher Andrew's For the President's Eyes Only, or any of many good histories of espionage in World War II.



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Hitler's Japanese Confidant Review

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(More customer reviews)Carl Boyd has produced an exceptionally lucid and revealing book that traces U.S. decoding attack on Berlin-Tokyo radio communications of Gen. Oshima Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassdor to the Third Reich, and its impact on the outcome of WWII. According to Boyd, these decoded diplomatic messages, known in the U.S. and Great Britain as MAGIC, were pivotal in Allied decision-making at critical junctures during the war. The author contends that, because the British were unable to read the secret communications of the top Nazi leadership, MAGIC filled a crucial gap in British ULTRA message decoding efforts. According to Boyd, Oshima was covertly converted into "an inadvertent informer of incalculable importance in leading the Allies to victory." Because Oshima had a very close personal relationship with Hitler and foreign minister von Ribbentropp, had their trust and respect, and had access to their higest level secrets, his MAGIC decoded radio messages were especially revealing and valuable for Allied planners. His military experience and analytical abilities also made his detailed characterizations of the disposition and condition of German forces in Europe and on the eastern front especially enlightening to the Allies and critical to planning for Operation OVERLORD. Boyd observes that "The margin of success on the Normandy beaches was narrow, but MAGIC and Anglo-American cooperation made the difference."Boyd's book is the first detailed account of Oshima's role as a primary source of Allied wartime intelligence through MAGIC. He draws heavily on declassified National Security Agency documents recently released to the National Archives. There is more, however, to this story of decoding covertly collected enemy radio intercepts that remains classified, especially in the British archives, which won't be declassified for more than twenty years.This is a thoroughly documented, superbly written, and rich account of the application of communications intelligence during WWII. It should be a stimulating read for all serious WWII historians and an entertaining read for all others.

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Japanese Intelligence in World War II (General Military) Review

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(More customer reviews)This is a major study of Japanese intelligence in World War II by an academic.
Author narrates Japanese intelligence-gathering methods.Information was gathered from different sources: HUMINT,SIGINT,OSINT.Japanese realised the importance of code-breaking.IJA General Staff invited Jan Kowalewski of Polish Army to help break the cipher system used by Red Army. This was a new information to me.Tokyo exploited SIGINT for establishing foothold in northern Indo China. Japan was locked in a debilitating war in China and wanted desperately cut supply to Chinese forces.SIGINT ,however.failed in ascertaining Allied reaction when Japanese forces penetrated southern Indo China which led to the imposition of trade embargo and halting of oil exports to Japan.
Author says Japanese use of tactical intelligence prelude to Pacific War was good but fails to provide to details.Intelligence branch of IJN had a spy ring which operated from Japanese consulate in Honololu.Thanks to the spy ring IJN knew that northern sector of Pearl Harbor was devoid of air patrols. As plans for attack on Pearl Harbor mounted,IJN stepped up radio intelligence coverage of American military presence in Hawaii. Kwajelin DF station eaves dropped on the communication of Pacific Fleet and the US Army Air Corps in Hawaii. It established the rhythm and pattern of US air patrols which revealed that flights were exclusively to west and south of island and north where Japanese air fleet was to approach remained uncovered.Spy ring further reported water of Pearl lacked depth, an information which helped Japanese navy to modify torpedoes making it skim across shallow waters of Pearl.
At nine o clock in the morning of November 1, 1941 Japanese liner Taiyo Maru docked at pier 8 in Honololu harbor.Aboard the ship disguised as stewards were officers who served in the intelligence branch of IJN. The ship was on a secret mission. The men were told to check wind and atmospheric pressure while crossing especially how ships behaved in the stormy seas of north Pacific.During the voyage officers stood on the bridge scanning the horizon with binoculars.This was to find out whether there was any possibility of Japanese fleet being sighted by American Alaskan/ Midway-based air patrols. Japanese did not encounter any other ship while crossing. Information proved valuable as it helped IJN to plot the course of Adm Nagumo's fleet to Pearl Harbor.
Prelude to the Japanese invasion of Singapore and Malayan peninsula espionage organisation called Unit 82( which worked for the Japanese War Ministry) conducted a through reconnaissance of the area. Unit collected data about topography, road network,ports,military installations,airfields. It found British had about 200 obsolete aircraft.Quality of British Commonwealth forces needs lot to be desired.Defences were found to be deplorably inadequate.Unit gathered stunning intelligence on ground defences of Singapore.It was found fortress was solid and strong from the sea but rear facing the Johore area was weak.Not even Mr.Churchill perceived this vulnerability.
Author has tendency to put things euphemistically.Instead of saying ethnocentrism it would have better to say racism ,a quality which made Anglo Americans to fatally underestimate the Japanese. Another lacuna of the book, the author could have added a glossary section. The text abounds in acronyms, abbreviations. Glossary section of the book would have helped the reader to get quick grip of the jargons used. Due to its absence reader has to keep on flipping pages for reference.
Author is of the opinion that structural flaws hindered the smooth functioning of Japanese intelligence.Like the German Kriegsmarine, IJN thought its ciphers could not be hacked.Even after Adm Yamamoto's tragic death ,it failed to improve its cipher security. What I found appalling was lack of inter service co-operation in Japanese armed forces. IJN 's crptanalytical ability was definitely superior to IJN.It hacked M-138 ciphers used by State Department for routing its confidential messages and knew IJN's ciphers were vulnerable. But refused to share this information.Better inter service co operation would have helped Navy to plug holes in its cipher security prelude MI operation.
Final word has not been written on war time operations of Japanese intelligence.There are many things which we still don't know.Immediately after the war secret documents related to SIGINT were burned.Fearing punishment Japanese officers have remained mute about their war time activities. So details given in the book are fragmentary at best which author has managed to tease out from availaible records. Nevertheless, author has resurrected a study which has languished for so long.



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In the eyes of history, Japanese intelligence in World War II has fared very poorly. However, these historians have most often concentrated on the later years of the war, when Japan was fighting a multi-front war against numerous opponents. In this groundbreaking new study, Japanese scholar Ken Kotani re-examines the Japanese Intelligence department, beginning with the early phase of the war. He points out that without the intelligence gathered by the Japanese Army and Navy they would have been unable to achieve their long string of victories against the forces of Russia, China, and Great Britain. Notable in these early campaigns were the successful strikes against both Singapore and Pearl Harbor. Yet as these victories expanded the sphere of Japanese control, they also made it harder for the intelligence services to gather accurate information about their growing list of adversaries. At the battle of Midway in 1942, Japanese intelligence suffered its worst mishap when the Americans broke their code and tricked the Japanese into revealing the target of their attack. It was a mistake from which they would never recover. As the military might of Japan was forced to retreat and her forces deteriorated, so too did her intelligence services.

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Day of Deceit : The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor Review

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(More customer reviews)Day of Deceit is a well documented account of the Roosevelt administration's efforts to provoke the Japanese into attacking the US to have an excuse to enter the war against Germany. No progressive democrat or reactionary republican can give this text an honest reading without coming to the conclusion that the Roosevelt administration, rather than being a reluctant entrant into the war, was an enthusiastic and very active provocateur.
If the propositions of this text were not true, no WWII archives would still be secret.

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Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor Review

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(More customer reviews)Most books about Pearl Harbor, from the many volumes of the Congressional Pearl Harbor Hearings to the two-volume study by the late Gordon Prange detail all kinds of intelligence available to the United States that forewarned of the Japanese attack. If you have some background in that history, Stinnett's well-documented book adds new material to the story and discloses a set of Japanese Navy communications intercepts that complement more publicized decoded exchanges among the Japanses diplomatic corps.
The notion that high minded government leaders might conspire to manipulate American public opinion in support of a cause they think important and worth American lives is not as evocative in the post-Vietnam politics than it would have been in 1941.
Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson both managed to entice "enemy" attacks on U.S. forces to rally American public opinion Congressional support. They aren't alone. While damage to the U.S. fleet and personnel at Pearl Harbor far exceeded the couple of bullet holes inflicted on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964, the pre-event manipulation was not all that different. That people in government might conspire to keep their machinations hidden from the press and public, sadly, isn't novel either anymore. Radiation experiments, commandos known to be captured, but written off as killed and all the rest have taught us almost too much about human nature.
While Stinnett writes bitterly about the impact on lives and careers of competent officers and men caught up in concealing vital intelligence information from Hawaiian-based officers and subsequently threatened and besmirched to maintain secrecy long after the event, even now, when records are still held secret by the DOD in some bizarre interpretation of protecting the National Defense. At the same time, however, Sinnett and any person with a memory and conscience is hard put to accept the possible outcome of world events in the 1940s had the United States stayed outof the European War.
If this is your first Pearl Harbor book you may get lost in the detail and obscurity needed to substantiate the book's argument. Read something else first, but read this one too.

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