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(More customer reviews)There are few events that prompt as much spontaneous discussions regarding the possibility of conspiracy and guilty prior knowledge as those involving the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Indeed, there are a whole catalogue of titles dealing with the possibilities, the associated issues, and with the substance of arguments surrounding all of the varied possibilities, which seem to have endless permutations and countless variations. So too here in British author John Costello's excellent exposition, the fascinating world of this "what did the President know, and when did he know it" whodunit is deftly explored by a virtual master of the genre. Also the author of such notable titles as "The Pacific War" and "And I was There", Costello addresses himself to a welter of issues and conditions that paint an indelible picture of what he conceives to be the actual circumstances surrounding the Japanese attack.
Indeed, the author not only asks a number of interesting rhetorical questions regarding the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor itself, but also delves into the shocking related attack on the American forces in the Philippines later the same day. Why, he asks, given his being warned so far in advance, did General Douglas MacArthur allow the Japanese forces to destroy the greatest single concentration of American air power in the Pacific region some nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor? And, in answering the question by way of detailing the complex series of miscommunications and fumbles surrounding MacArthur's mishandling of the circumstances, the author also raises the issue of MacArthur's unlikely escape from the blame game following in the aftermath of the attacks. Seems that those in power in Washington were so intimidated by MacArthur's positive image and reputation among the press that they dare not attack him openly by court marshalling or reprimanding him. In essence, his political connections saved him. Instead, after ordering MacArthur off the island, ostensibly to take command of all the Pacific forces regrouping in Australia, Roosevelt rewarded the general with the Congressional Medal Of Honor.
Also discussed here is the half million dollar payoff that the Philippine Government gave to MacArthur as he departed the islands, as is the desire of the Philippine government to try to maintain their neutrality, an exercise in futility that may have played fatefully into the hands of the Japanese, and which the author suggests may have influenced MacArthur in his decision not to attack or save the pacific-based American planes under his command. Yet the book spends much more energy and time covering the ways in which the diplomatic and military miscalculations on the part of both Roosevelt and Churchill played almost perfectly into the hands of the Japanese. Yet it was, according to Costello, more the loss of the Pacific air power rather than the losses at Pearl Harbor that so severely limited and hampered American efforts to stem the rising tide of Japanese hegemony over the Far East in 1942.
The author writes with considerable skill in arguing that it was the combined blunders, bungling, and malfeasance on the part of Roosevelt, Churchill and MacArthur that left the western world in such mortal danger at the end of 1941. For one thing, Roosevelt had committed the United States to a secret agreement with the British to aid in the defense of the British empire's Far Eastern reaches, a pact that was likely both illegal and unconstitutional. For another, the decision to move the bulk of MacArthur's army forces 5,000 miles west of Hawaii to the Philippines left Hawaii weak and overexposed to a potential Japanese attack. Finally, the combined neglect of countless encrypted messages concerning the details of the attack as well as MacArthur's failure to mount a preemptive air attack despite being directly ordered to do so doomed the American hopes for any quick resolution to the conflict once it had started. In sum, it was the colossal lack of good leadership that led us into the disaster of December 7, 1941, and in spite of the fact that all three men are held in high regard and remembered warmly, they were largely responsible for the American failure to prevent the disaster at Pearl Harbor in a day of infamy. This is an interesting book and a worthwhile read. Enjoy!
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