Showing posts with label battle of midway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label battle of midway. Show all posts

Miracle at Midway Review

Miracle at Midway
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Just how fortunate the United States was in winning the closely contested navy engagement at Midway in the central Pacific in mid 1942 is evident to any reader ofthis very well documented and quite balanced account of one of the largest and most famous exchanges between the US navy and their Japanese counterparts during the course of World War Two. By using extensive inputs from both Japanese and American participants and observers of the sea battle, the authors thread together a memorable and engaging narrative of the events leading up to and involving both sides during the summer months of that fateful year. It was one for the record books, and one that demonstrated conclusively that the rules of war at sea had changed forever from one dominated by capital ships like battleships and cruisers to one dominated by aircraft carriers and attack airplanes.
In the devastating aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the American Navy was looking for an opportunity to engage the Japanese in a "mano-a-mano" confrontation, hoping to even the odds and shorten the war by using what we felt would be surprise and tactics to overcome the numerical advantage the Japanese enjoyed in numbers of both ships (especially in terms of aircraft carriers) and launchable aircraft. Even though the Japanese had blundered badly at the battle of the Coral Sea, they left the scene believing the fracas had been won, and that they had further damaged the American fleet by sinking three carriers. And though the U.S. Navy did in fact limp away having lost some of its few carriers either through sinking or damage, in actuality they had inflicted more damage than they had incurred. Furthermore, soon one of the badly damaged U. S. Navy carriers (the Yorktown) would be repaired and ready to sail in support of the Midway engagement.
Also, by cracking certain aspects of the Japanese Navy's wireless communication codes, the Americans were able to determine not only what the Japanese were ostensibly planning in terms of a strategy to take Midway, but also what the specific positioning and disposition of the various aspects of the Japanese naval force would be. Obviously, this information added to the element of surprise gave the Americans a huge tactical advantage, and made victory much more possible. Yet it did not guarantee anything. It was the tactical brilliance and contemporaneous innovation of the on-site commanders in the American force that won the day. In a series of engagements that did not change the course of the battle until the last few remaining waves of American aircraft suddenly sank or damaged the majority of the Japanese carriers, the Americans succeeded both through their own daring and a few fatal tactical errors on the part of the Japanese commanders.
The results were devastating for the Japanese, who never again could muster the kind of raw carrier power, or just as importantly, ever replace the huge number of experienced carrier-based aircraft pilots needed to successfully engage and threaten the expanding American task forces that within another 12 to 18 months would virtually transform the character of the war in the Pacific, leading the Japanese into waging an almost suicidal war of attrition which they had no chance to win. This is a well-written, well-documented, and entertaining book that helps the reader to understand just how critical to both the Americans and the Japanese the fateful naval engagement at Midway was, and how the results determined the course of the rest of the war in the Pacific. Enjoy!

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Here is the definitive history of the battle of Midway, an American victory that marked the turning point of the war in the Pacific during World War II. Told with the same stylistic flair and attention to detail as the bestselling At Dawn We Slept, Miracle at Midway brings together eyewitness accounts from the men who commanded and fought on both sides. The sweeping narrative takes readers into the thick of the action and shows exactly how American strategies and decisions led to the triumphant victory that paved the way for the defeat of Japan. "A stirring, even suspenseful narrative . . . The clearest and most complete account so far." (Newsday) "Something special among war histories . . . No other gives both sides of the battle in as detailed and telling a manner."(Chicago Sun-Times) "A gripping and convincing account." (The Philadelphia Inquirer)

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Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway Review

Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway
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. Don't be misled by the title, this is not just another telling of the entire Battle of Midway story. Instead it's an exhaustively detailed new account of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at Midway, accomplished with a depth of research and analysis not previously seen. The book is crammed with a dazzling set of graphics, including brilliant computer-generated charts and diagrams that very signficantly aid the text.
. Of course, anyone attempting to rewrite the history of the IJN at Midway needs to convince potential readers that the new book offers something signficant over the time-honored resource for that subject, Fuchida and Okumiya's "Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan." The authors of "Shattered Sword" not only accepted that challenge, but they convincingly demonstrate that Fuchida was very loose with certain key facts in his Midway book, done in order to serve personal aims that didn't necessarily require telling the truth. The result has been a number of deeply-entrenched myths that permeate the popular history of the battle. "Shattered Sword" ably exposes those myths and convincingly demonstrates in each case what really happened and why.
. This reviewer frequently has occasion to recommend references on the Battle of Midway to students and others beginning a study of that epic clash. In such cases I always recommnend Robert Cressman's "A Glorious Page In Our History" as the best overall account of the battle. I now need to add "Shattered Sword" to the short list of works that those doing serious research on Midway really must have. In particular, anyone who has read Fuchida's "Midway" and puts significant stock in it really ought to read "Shattered Sword" to learn what the earlier work either omitted or got quite wrong.

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The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Diplomacy & Statecraft) Review

The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Diplomacy and Statecraft)
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This book is a collection of ten papers on the Washington Naval Limitation Conference in the early 1920's. The emphasis of each paper is on the position of each of the participants of the conference. Since the book is rather short ' 319 pages ' the papers are not very detailed. These papers primarily stress the political and strategic aspects as they affected each participant. There is little on the technical effects although these were rather important (see A. D. Baker III's 'Battlefleets and Diplomacy' at www.warships1.com/W-INRO/INRO_Battlefleet.htm). The coverage of the U. S. and British positions offers little that is new, but the material on those of France and Italy is not so well known. There is a tendency to interpret the arms control negotiations from the viewpoint of Cold War arms control negotiations which leads to rather anachronistic interpretations.

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The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results.

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Target: Pearl Harbor Review

Target: Pearl Harbor
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In "Target: Pearl Harbor," Michael Slackman has written the best-balanced account of the event. Gordon Prange's monumental "At Dawn We Slept" invested hundreds of pages in assessing the various imputations of blame and other issues of interest to specialists. Slackman presents a "just-the-facts-ma`m" approach better suited to ordinary readers. While he admits he has added little new to the known facts, he pulls no punches about the ones already known. Even the obsessive Prange left out the most gruesome details.
Not many Americans, then or since, had the moral courage of a "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who capped a long retreat from the Japanese with the assessment, "I claim we took a hell of a licking." Many professional historians, starting with the eminent Charles Beard, have made fools of themselves by trying to take credit for the victory at Pearl Harbor away from the Japanese and blaming it on somebody else, usually Franklin Roosevelt.
Slackman points out that, "For the Japanese, Pearl Harbor was, in strategic terms, a subsidiary operation," since their eyes were on Southeast Asia and its minerals.
The Pacific War, as Japanese and English historians rightly prefer to call it, was "a classic case of cross-cultural misunderstanding."
The Americans held Japanese abilities in contempt, preferring to worry about the expected sabotage from the Japanese-Americans who made up 40 percent of the resident population in the islands. The Japanese in the islands proved to be totally loyal to America.
Religion also entered strongly into the equation, although Slackman does not mention this. One Navy pilot who was shot down at Pearl Harbor and later claimed credit for sinking a Japanese aircraft carrier at Midway described the Japanese as "heathens," as if this was another justification for making war.
On the Japanese side, similar contempt for the soft Americans led them to overplay their hand. The Japanese were good - as they proved by beating the U.S. Navy again and again in the Solomons - but they were also lucky. Slackman's assessment of the motivations and capabilities of the two sides is the best-balanced I have read, with one exception - like almost every other historian, he judges the author of the Pearl Harbor attack, Isoruku Yamamoto, to have been "brilliant."
"Foolhardy" describes him better. Against weak, unprepared opponents, he did well. But he didn't know how to exploit victories or prepare a defense. Even at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese losses were 10 percent; when losses rose that high in the aerial war against Germany, they were regarded as unacceptable and operations were suspended.
Few of the experiences of the attackers are recorded in "Target: Pearl Harbor," because neither the records nor the men survived the war. On the American side, December 7 was a day of panic, fear, suffering and bravery. Fourteen Americans were awarded the Medal of Honor, and several civilians were given the highest honors the military could manage.
But there was infamy on the American side as well. American soldiers and sailors robbed the corpses of their slain comrades, a fact that even Prange decided not to mention.
Pearl Harbor need not have happened, at least not the way it did happen. Fighting admirals like Bill Halsey were loaded for bear the first week of December but didn't meet any Japanese. Golfing admirals and generals, like Husband Kimmel and Walter Short, the Oahu commanders, were worse than useless.
The recriminations after Pearl Harbor were simultaneously genuine and politically motivated, as Slackman understands. The recriminations, however motivated, set up the United States for a second disaster, as bad in its way as Pearl Harbor.
After the war, it was believed (incorrectly) that a failure of intelligence had "caused" Pearl Harbor. This belief was one of the potent fathers of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oil still seeps from the hull of the battleship Arizona; the corrosion of central intelligence still seeps through the national polity.
Slackman did most of the research for "Target: Pearl Harbor" in the early '80s under the sponsorship of the National Park Service and the Arizona Memorial Museum Association. The association is co-publisher with the University of Hawaii Press.


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First Shot: The Untold Story of the Japanese Minisubs That Attacked Pearl Harbor Review

First Shot: The Untold Story of the Japanese Minisubs That Attacked Pearl Harbor
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On December 7, 1941, the Japanese launched the sneak attack on the American Pacific fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Over 300 aircraft operating from 6 aircraft carriers participated in the attack, but lost in the annals of history are the Japanese midget submarines, who's job it was to penetrate the harbor and launch torpedoes at the American ships.
The destroyer USS Ward was patrolling the waters surrounding the entrance to the harbor on that fateful morning. Suddenly, a lookout aboard the Ward spotted an object that looked like a periscope. Knowing that no American submarines were operating in the area, the Ward swung into action, attacking the sub with gunfire and depth charges. One shot hit the sub directly on the conning tower. The little sub then disappeared beneath the waves. The Ward immediately sent a report to Pearl Harbor but, the message failed to rouse any suspicion or action from the Americans. Approximately one hour later, the Japanese planes appeared, and the rest is history. Imagine what might have happened if the Americans would have taken the Ward's report more seriously and had planes in the air, anti-aircraft guns ready, and ships prepared to sail into open water? One can only wonder. As it turns out, the failure to act on the Ward's message is just another blunder committed by the Americans on this day of infamy.
I felt this book had some good points, but the title is somewhat confusing. When I purchased the book, I was hoping to read about the midget submarines and the role they played in the attack on Pearl Harbor. I've read numerous books on the Pearl Harbor attack, but the efforts of the mini-subs are not described in great detail. I was somewhat disappointed with this book, because the author only devotes perhaps one or two chapters of this book to the mini-subs. Instead, he talks about the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and he devotes an entire chapter to the death of Admiral Yamamoto at the hands of American fighter pilots. He even mentions the sinking of the USS Indianapolis. This happened 3 1/2 years after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
This book has some interesting chapters, such as the narrative about the capture of officer Kazuo Sakamaki, commander of one of the Japanese min-subs. However, this book tends to concentrate on the Pacific war as a whole rather than solely on the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Overall, I rate this book as only average. The author should have kept to his original theme about the Japanese mini-subs' roles in the Pearl Harbor attack instead of branching out to cover the entire Pacific campaign.

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"If we had only known even a bit of what John Craddock tells us now, our own history could have been so very different."--Sherry Sontag, coauthor of Blind Man's Bluff
In First Shot, John Craddock investigates a little-known but clear eleventh-hour warning that, had it been heeded, might have enabled the Navy's Pearl Harbor command to blunt the Japanese assault and save ships and lives. Craddock reveals that the attack plan of Japan's Admiral Yamamoto included five midget submarines, each carrying two men and two torpedoes. First Shot vividly recreates the action on the deck of the U.S.S. Ward on the morning of December 7 as the outmoded relic of an earlier war engaged a tiny, state-of-the-art undersea fighting machine.


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From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Review

From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States
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I've read virtually every English-language book on the subject of the history of Japanese militarism and history from Perry through World War II. Had I another life or more time, I would do a PhD on the topic, as it fascinates me deeply. Thus, I greatly anticipated this book, and, despite my low rating (3/5) treasure it as an important part of my collection. Prof. Asada has truly done the world a great service by writing this book, as, if nothing else, it can be used as a stepping stone for futher clarification and thought on the basic question of "why did Japan initiate World War II in the Pacific?" I thank Prof Asada deeply from his work, and apologize to him that my review in the following will be a bit harsh.
Basically, while book itself is full of "facts", it is a monumentally dull read, even for a person fascinated by the subject as I am. I literally have used this book as a sleeping aid. The details of the various naval limitation treaty conferences are hashed and rehashed ad nauseum, and the littlest tweaks in IJN strategic doctrine are hashed and rehashed ad nausuem. This, in and of itself, however, is not damning.
The problem is that I feel like I am too often presented with a mountainfull of historical facts but a teacup of insight. For example, one of the major themes of the book is the question of treaty limits - would the Japanese get 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, or 70% of the US tonnage limit? Apparently the debates on the exact number were enough to have made Japanese officers cry, protest, resign, un-resign, declare that they had been mortally wronged, etc. We are presented of the details of who wanted what number and when, and why they changed their opinions and views, but none of this really ever gets to the heart of the matter.
There is no attempt at (for lack of a better term) psychoanalysis of either indivuals or groups to really make us understand, at a really deep level, WHY.
For a while, I thought that this was because the author was content to play the dispassionate historian. But, with time, the actual reason for this blase treatment became obvious. It's basically the same reason that the book stops at Pearl Harbor: the author, if not an Emperor and Japan apologist, takes great pains to NOT provide any analysis since such analysis would be offensive to Japanese readers.
Remember, this guy is a senior professor Emeritus at a Japanese university. Perhaps the analysis itself is too hard for the author to do for personal reasons? Perhaps, if he is intellectually honest, given where he is in life, he is waiting for an eager student to build upon his base and do what he could not, for reasons of political correctness?
(This is why it gets 3 stars, not 4), the author quite unfairly cherry-picks sources and believes third-hand quotes that make the Showa Emperor (Hirohito) come off smelling like a rose. There is no attempt to refute other historians who have presented far more compelling cases for the Emperor's complicity. Prof. Asasa does not attempt serious source analysis - the rest of us have very good reason to understand why somebody, writing, for example, in the 1940s or 1950s would feel compelled to write in their memoirs things that protected the Emperor. Often, such writings are recollected quotations that contrast sharply with the historical record elsewhere. No attempt is made to analyze such emperor-defending sources. Rather, they are taken as gospel and then lofty and overbroad conclusions of the Emperor's innocence are made.
I do not speak Japanese so well, though perhaps with a little bit of study it would get much better. Therefore, as a specialist 'amateur' I dig deeply into whatever translated sources on the matter I can find. Often, this means the occasional rare translated book that can be found, for example, at the bookshop of the little museum near Yasukuni. Such books enjoy english readership probably in the hundreds, but they allow people like me a rare glimpse into what the Japanese are saying about their own history. Yes, Yasukuni Jinja is in some ways a right-wing haven, but what to be said when a book about an ostensibly neutral topic such as, say, Saburo Sakai (a famous IJN ace), has paranthetical comments hinting at the nobility of the Japanese cause?
Certainly Prof. Asada's book is far too intelligent and mature to go off into tangents about the reality of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere (even if that concept were in the ken of the book, which it is not). However, "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" in some sense represents the high end of the Japanese millieu of writing on the war (and of course I am exclusing the writings of firebrands like Ienaga Saburo) - that is to say, it's still full of rationalizations, apologetics, and, obfuscatory-through-overdetail.
Prof Asada, you painted a wonderful picture of trees. It's the forest that you missed.
For the reader: worth reading if you are interested in the topic. However, don't let the scholarly approach lull you or overwhelm you into forgetting that this book is guilty of large errors of omission.


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And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway--Breaking the Secrets Review

And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway--Breaking the Secrets
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And I was there.
This is a great book by one who was there, Adm Layton. He was Adm Kimmels intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor.
He shows how the incompetence of the Navy in Washington led to the surprise attack at Pearl, by the Navy, specifically adm Stark and Kelly Turner, not giving Pearl the vital information they had about Jap intentions, but refused to give Pearl. The Navy also had 2 intelligence groups fighting for the information, and control, evaluating, and dissemination of the information. This too sabotaged the intelligence efforts, and does to this day.
Gen Marshall is also responsible for the debacle. He was reprimanded, but Roosevelt set aside the Congressional verdict on him.
Kimmel was judged not guilty of any wrongdoing by the Navy, but found derelict by Congress, a tragic miscarriage of justice, due to lies under testimony by Stark, and Turner.
The Redmon brothers are faulted too for ousting the most brilliant Navy intelligence officer, Rochefort, who correctly guessed the time and location of the Midway battle.
Another tragic aftermath of Pearl, was the loss of Wake Island. Kimmel had a carrier task force sailing to resupply and relieve the garrision that was under attack by the Japs. This would have surprised the Japs and could have sunk many Jap ships, saved Wake Island, and kept open the supply lines to the Phillipines. Unfortunaely, Kimmel was relieved, and Adm Pye replaced him Pye lost his nerve and cancelled the mission.
MacArthur is noted, as being in charge of the Phillipines, and being under orders to attack Formosa with his B17's when Pearl was attacked. He had a 9 hour warning after Pearl had been attacked, and had been told to attack. It was not until years after this book was published that the records of why Mac did nothing in the Phillipines were found. He was paid $650,000 by Pres Quezon of the Phillipines to do nothing, as he wanted to be neutral. MacArthur lost the Phillipines, a far more important strategic outpost than Pearl, as well as half the B17's we had, and 1/5 of our fighters, on the ground, just as what happened at Pearl, only 9 hours later, after he had multiple phone calls from Washington to attack the Japs.
The battle of Guadalcanal and other Pacific battles is also gone into in some detail
It was Nimitz, not Mac Arthur that devised the island hopping idea.
A great book by a hero who was there.

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Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor Review

Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor
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Not much to say except that this book is a must read for everyone who is interested in the origins of the Pacific War or World War II.

Author Miller does an excellent job of depicting Japan's vulnerable economy, desperately needing foreign exchange but being dependent on silk as its mainstay in foreign trade. Japan possessed (& possesses) few natural resources and was forced to import its oil, iron ore, metal scrap, and almost all products needed to grow its economy or carry on a war.
The US played the role of spoiler, attempting to hold Japan's economic survival hostage to its international good behavior (as seen by Roosevelt), and the leaders of Japan could not allow that to continue for many reasons, not the least of which was the belief in Japan's destiny to rule the East. The activities of Acheson under Roosevelt's guidance are fascinating, and the reader is carried along as in a suspense novel leading toward a catastrophic conclusion. The author blends facts and figures with activities and policies with amazing ease.
My only criticism stems from the missing links to external events and the fears and attitudes of others. For example, the freeze of July, 1941, closely followed the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, and there is substantial evidence that Roosevelt sought open hostilities with Japan while the Russians were still in the field. By November, 1941, many in Roosevelt's administration felt that Moscow was imperiled and that the Russians could soon collapse, leaving Britain and the US to face Germany alone and the very distinct probability that Japan would then choose to honor the Tripartite Pact and enter the fray at the most opportune moment. Without going into a full discussion of Pearl Harbor, there is nonetheless much evidence that Roosevelt was aware that an attack was coming, but felt the US could weather the blows. This book records the tightening of the screws on Japan until Japan launched its attack before the Soviet Union was defeated (although, of course, it never was) because of economic reasons rather than political ones. One wonders if Roosevelt had not taken the tack he did and begun supplying the Soviet Union with critical items in the winter of 1941, would Germany have prevailed? I think not, but there is no arguing that the assistance of the US to Britain and Russia was vastly more helpful sooner than later.
At any rate, Acheson's activities are more understandable in this light, as is the ever-increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Japan by the US up to Pearl Harbor.
So in the end, it was the economic situation that caused the Japanese to attack when they did, not the political attitudes or timing due to the other events in World War II. In effect, Roosevelt launched a spoiling attack against Japan using economics that was very effective in changing the timing of events more to the US's advantage. That is the reason this book is so important, and it is recommended to all serious students of World War II.


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God's Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor (The Warriors) Review

God's Samurai: Lead Pilot at Pearl Harbor (The Warriors)
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A friend of mine introduced me to this book in April of this year. He told me it was unlike any book about the Pacific war that he had ever read. Although skeptical at first, I sill went ahead and purchased the book. I left it on my book-shelve for several months and forgot all about it. As I began packing up in July to move I noticed this book again, so I picked it up and began reading it. I found the style of writing extremely fluid, and the chapters were concise. This well balanced account of Mitsuo Fuchida life traces it from his days as an Imperial naval aviator to Christian evangelist. 'God's Samurai' is a truly inspirational book filled with numerous accounts of honor, bravery, loyalty, and sacrifice - all the codes of a Samurai warrior. I have enjoyed this book tremendously, and I have just begun reading, 'Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy's Story' by Mitsuo Fuchida, Roger Pineau (Editor),Masatake Okumiya(Contributor). Both 'God's Samurai' and 'Midway' are 'must-have' books for anyone who is truly interested in the Pacific war and naval battles!

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