The Day Our World Changed: Punahou '52 Remembers Pearl Harbor Review

The Day Our World Changed: Punahou '52 Remembers Pearl Harbor
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To go to world with the world is an event that many hope never has to be experienced again. "The Day Our World Changed: December 7, 1941" is a collection of stories from primary students across the country, stating what they were doing when the world changed, and the United States entered World War II, an event still strongly felt even today, generations later. "The Day Our World Changed" is a fascinating and insightful read, and a grade-A addition to history collections.


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This collection of eighty-four stories is written by classmates who, although living in various places, were primary students on December 7, 1941 when Pearl Harbor was attacked. This day was to change all their lives. These shared memories and vivid recollections range from moments during the attack to the impact on their lives and the world. In addtional the books contains over 100 unique photos.

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War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay Review

War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay
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I was very disappointed with this book. Considering that it was published in 1995, I was shocked at the amount of out-of-date and incorrect information it contained. You would be better off purchasing the biased but informative volumes written by Morrison. In fact, this book is little more than a rehash of previous works.
I was particularly struck by blatant errors contained in this book. Three examples will suffice:
1. The reference on page 195 (paperback version) to the Japanese Battleship 'Kumano.' There was no such ship. There was a 'cruiser' of that name however.
2. The everchanging description of the Japanese Battleship 'Ise.' Page 153: it's a 'battleship.' On Page 354 it's a 'half-carrier.' On page 363 it's a 'converted battleship.' And on page 478 it's a 'battleship' again. This may seem minor but it indicates a complete ignorance on the part of the author that the ship was modified ONCE with a deck added in place of the aft 14" gun turrets. This was not explained and an uninformed reader may be confused or assume that there is more than one 'Ise.' It also raises the possibility that the author's research in some places goes little beyond quoting other sources uncritically.
3. The bizarre restating of the since-discredited (or at least now much in doubt) theory that the American submarine 'Nautilus' sank the Japanese Carrier 'Soryu' during the battle of Midway. This was shocking to me since one of the books listed in the bibliography lays to rest this apparently false notion (Fuchida's 'Midway' which the author should have read-- he clearly didn't). It was the 'Kaga' the sub attempted to torpedo: and the torpedos all failed to detonate or hit the carrier. NOTE: Part of the 'Kaga's' remains have been located in the Pacific. The 'Soryu' may be near-by...
I lastly note that I am not an expert on United States Naval History during the Second World War. I am however a former history teacher and have had a life-long interest in this subject. I point this out because I strongly suspect that many other errors are contained in this book which I simply failed to notice.

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Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richardson Review

Pearl Harbor Countdown: Admiral James O. Richardson
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Although this book is not a great book in that it does not include all aspects of the Pearl Harbor story, it does cover new and overlooked ground that adds another dimension to the American command and political scene at the time. The book centers on the life of Admiral James Otto Richardson, a potential candidate for the office given to Admiral King before Pearl Harbor and the commander of the Pacific Fleet immediately before Admiral Kimmel. It is actually very much a biography of Richardson, but the truly interesting portion, and the author's area of concentration, is Richardson's involvement with the move to Pearl Harbor by the US Pacific Fleet and his actions and knowledge of the political and command situations that cast light on the Pearl Harbor attack.
Richardson was involved in the creation and updating of War Plan Orange, specifically the Rainbow series of Rainbow One, Two (never issued) and Three. At no time did Richardson feel the Rainbow plans were realistic -- a serious indictment of American civilian and military leadership and obviously something that could not be told to the American public. Nevertheless, Richardson tended to blame Congress for this situation due to the lack of funding for the Navy rather than the President. (So what else is new -- Congress has never possessed much moral courage or foresight.)
Richardson vehemently opposed the move of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor in 1940 due to many well-founded factors (including its lack of training and supply facilities and unnecessary exposure), but Roosevelt wanted to move the fleet to Hawaii as an aggressive move towards the Central Pacific to place pressure on Japan. When the move became permanent Richardson opposed Roosevelt's edict in an overly frank manner. At a meeting with the President in October, 1940, Richardson told Roosevelt "that the senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the sucessful prosecution of a war in the Pacific." The idea was to convince the President that more input should be received and considered from the Navy hierarchy when making decisions about fleet operations and its bases. Instead Roosevelt was angered and within twenty-four hours called Admiral Stark to have Richardson relieved. Roosevelt had two hobbies, stamp collecting and his Navy, and he was not about to be told what to do with either.
Worse was to come. Although the decision had already been made to fire Richardson, he then went on the record to state that the Pacific Fleet was not combat ready. This was too much for Roosevelt who was in a campaign for his third term. From that point on, Richardson had to remain silent for political reasons. Richardson did so, remaining out of the Pearl Harbor controversy and delaying the publication of his autobiography until after the death of Admiral Stark. Richardson's book clearly placed much of the blame on Roosevelt, Stark and Marshall for their feckless inattention to the Pacific Fleet's danger when they knew the Japanese were going to attack on the morning of December 7th. Although they did not know for certain that the attack would directed at Pearl Harbor, a large number of the senior officers in the Navy (including Stark and Richardson) knew Japanese history and expected an attack to be directed at Pearl since that was where the fleet was. The details and discussion of these events, along with Richardson's testimony at the Japanese war criminal trials take up a respectable part of this book.
President Roosevelt was playing a dangerous game that, for political reasons, depended on the Japanese firing the first shot. No doubt he believed that Pearl Harbor was on high alert and could weather a Japanese attack, but he refused to make certain the Hawaiian command was prepared by being alerted that morning concerning a possible imminent attack. Richardson believed the Roberts Commission was formed to divert the focus from Washington and the discussions that took place that morning. He believed that Admiral Stark was told not to pick up the phone and call Kimmel by scrambler since the President had decided that Marshall would be official dispatcher of the warnings to Hawaii. Marshall, however, totally failed, sending a cable by Western Union rather than talking to General Short by scrambler phone -- an almost unbelievable dereliction of duty. More amazingly, history has given Marshall a pass on his incredibly deficient performance.
With respect to Kimmel and Short, Richardson believed that they had to be relieved if for no other reason than as he states, "no armed force should remain under the command of a leader under whom it had suffered such a loss." He felt that military officers would understand this principle, even if the public in its hysteria wanted to affix blame by congressional and other inquiries. The rest of the details and the bureaucratic turf wars and lack of communication are also discussed at length in this book, but more as sideshows.
The work is not an easy read due to the author's organization of the immediate war years by activity rather than chronologically. The reader must go back and forth in the text to understand what was happening at what time. Ordinarily I would have reduced my rating to four stars due to this difficulty, but the book's importance required me to give it five. There are also a number of typographic errors, but that is to be expected in this day and age of minimal editing skills in many publishing houses.
If you are interested in the Pearl Harbor story and the US Navy from 1938 to 1942, purchase and read this book!

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Adm. James Richardson strongly disagreed about permanently docking navy ships in Pearl Harbor, believing that the Japanese would feel threatened by the proximity of America's Pacific fleet and organize a preemptory attack. With their exposed and isolated location, the ships would be vulnerable to any such aggression. He also recognized that the navy did not have the manpower to fight a war in the Pacific in 1940. He relayed these concerns to all who would listen and protested the decision to politicians in Washington. In response, Pres. Franklin Delano Roosevelt relieved Richardson of his command. This biography covers Richardson's life from moderate beginnings to the investigations by the army and navy into shortcomings at Pearl Harbor, detailing his influences on the military.

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Pearl Harbor 1941 (Osprey Trade Editions) Review

Pearl Harbor 1941 (Osprey Trade Editions)
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This is a nice little picture book with an accompanying summary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Plenty of pictures and illustrations of the battle itself show the history of this great attack. The author describes both the Japanese and American point of views prior to the attack. Then a general description of the battle itself and the resulting outcome. There is not many personal stories in this book, just the basics of the attack itself. Lots of information in this thin book.
This is an average read. I like a book full of personal stories along with the history to become interested in the book. This is an analtical perspective of the attack and is more focused toward the military historian. A good perspective of the battle.

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Depending on opposing viewpoints, the attack on Pearl Harbor was either a brilliant manoeuvre or a piece of unparalleled villainy. This volume provides a detailed account of the one of the most significant events of World War II. The text is complemented by 3D battleviews, maps and photos.

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PEARL HARBOR STORY Review

PEARL HARBOR STORY
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MARSHALL'S DECEPTION
(Compiled by Tom Kimmel)
The following account of General Marshall's three appearances as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) is excerpted and quoted entirely from General Henry Russell's 160 page book, Pearl Harbor Story, which he wrote in 1944 and 1945, but did not publish. His heirs recognized its importance and published it in 2001. It is a remarkable firsthand account of how the APHB stumbled across the truth of the Pearl Harbor story, tried to ignore it, but could not. General Russell was a member of the APHB, along with its President General George Grunert, and General Walter Frank. The entirety of General Russell's book is strongly recommended for anyone interested in national defense, leadership, investigations, or the rule of law. This account explains why.
The APHB Prepares for Marshall's First Appearance as a Witness
"My chief interest centered in the testimony of General Marshall, as the responsible head of the War Department. To my disappointment I discovered that such testimony as he gave [to the Roberts Commission in 1941] had been omitted from the record. There was a brief statement that General Marshall had appeared before the Board [referring here to the Roberts Commission] and had described certain operations of the War Department; that these operations were of such secret nature that the Commission had felt justified in omitting them from its record. I must admit that I read this with some suspicions. General Marshall's technique in his appearance before public boards, particularly Congressional committees, was well known to me, and I have heard others refer to it. In advance he acquaints himself with what such bodies may desire and determines what he is willing to tell them. When he appears before the group, he immediately launches into a discussion of the subject and relies on his great powers of salesmanship to overwhelm the body to which he is talking. Ordinarily when he has finished with his discussion those to whom he was talking are overcome and excuse him. For the lack of a better term, we might describe this technique as the `Congressional Brush-off.'[pp.34-35]. . . .
"In the examination of General Marshall and a few others we were handicapped by General Grunert's directive that all questions be written and submitted to them well in advance of their appearance to testify. Every trial lawyer knows the value [of] being able to examine witnesses without notifying them in advance of the information sought. There is no time to think about the answers to be given or the effect of such answers on the witness making them. In the case of General Marshall the advantages of impromptu examination may have been unimportant. He is a very intelligent and skillful witness. This, coupled with the fact that he was the Chief of Staff of the Army and, replying to officers of his command, permitted him to get into the record such facts as he desired the Board to have. Occasionally, when faced with direct questions from which he could not escape, he made direct answers. Generally he was very evasive.
"I prepared a memorandum describing the procedure we would follow when Marshall was called, and setting forth the questions that we wanted him to answer. This memorandum was sent to Marshall's office, and a day was agreed upon when the Board, with its assistants, would go to that office to take the testimony.
Marshall's First Appearance as a Witness before the APHB
"On the appointed day a small automobile caravan. . . went to the General's office. Since I had been designated to investigate the War Department, it became my duty to examine Marshall. I had outlined very clearly the things that the Board wanted to know from him. The most important information desired was what he knew about the intentions and plans of the Japanese in the fall of 1941 and what part of this information he passed on to Short [General Walter S. Short, the head of the Army's Hawaiian Command]. . . . After some preliminaries in which the Board and General Marshall passed pleasantries, General Grunert announced that I would conduct the examination. I began by asking questions relating to what Marshall knew about Japanese plans and intentions, referring to the growing tensity in our relations with the Japanese Empire during the fall of 1941. As I now recall, I had asked one or two questions about relations between the War and State Departments when Marshall appeared somewhat vexed by my line of questioning and manifested some signs of irritation at me. In all events, he requested that every one leave the room with the exception of the three members of the Board, a Brig. Gen. Nelson, who was apparently an assistant to Marshall, and McNarney, remained in the room also.
"Alone with the Board, Marshall related to us what he described as information, almost too secret for him to talk about. It dealt with the breaking of the Japanese code. Dramatically, Marshall described the transcending value of the information that was being obtained as a result of deciphering Japanese messages.
"I am not certain about the effect of Marshall's statement on the other members of the Board. I must admit that I was under his spell. I was very greatly impressed with his descriptions of the importance of maintaining the highest secrecy about our breaking the Japanese code.
"I waited with much interest, nevertheless, for him to tell us what the War Department had discovered about Japanese plans and intentions in 1941 by virtue of having access to Japanese diplomatic exchanges. In this field we were greatly disappointed. Marshall used a lot of words, but said little. He discussed a day. This day was a sort of roving day, very indefinite. It moved around in November and finally passed over into December. Something was going to happen on that day. This something would be produced by Japanese activity. What it was, Marshall never said. I remember asking him on two occasions if it was true that the War Department knew that the Japanese were thinking about some day late in November or early December, but did not know the exact significance of that day. Each time Marshall replied that it was true. The picture of Marshall during his secret conference with members of the Board remains entirely clear in my mind. He was a most impressive figure. Words came to him with great readiness. He spoke with a most intense earnestness. I had always regarded Marshall as a very intellectual man. On this day Marshall, the super-salesman, was at his magnificent best.
"When he had finished his discussion he sent for the reporters and assistants. When they returned, with an air of finality, he wanted to know if he could be of further help to the Board. In the interim while the Board was reassembling, I recovered from the spell of Marshall's speech and was now back out of the stratosphere and in the Pentagon. I realized that the two main questions that the Board wanted to ask Marshall had not been answered. I remained curious about Marshall's knowledge of Japanese plans and intentions in 1941, and what he had passed on to Short. [pp.46-48]. . . .
"When he had finished the major portion of the examination I realized that we had made little progress in determining what Marshall knew about the Japanese plans and intentions in the late fall of 1941. So far as the evidence developed disclosed, he had told Short practically nothing. The nature of the examination had been such as to require a complete disclosure of everything that Marshall had sent Short. [p.50]. . . .

"I then turned to an examination of Marshall about the [`War-Warning'] message of November 27 (472) and Short's reply thereto. I do not recall that he described his relation to 472. He was very hazy about having seen Short's sabotage reply. . . . It was his assumption that he had seen the Short reply. He stated that whether he saw the Short reply or not, his responsibility in connection with it could not be escaped.
"In referring to questions about the form and substance of 472, he made the tremendously important statement that we will stand on the record as written. He realized then that he was on the defensive. He did not wish to discuss the probable effect of the limitations and restrictions in 472 on Short's thinking.
"Toward the end of the examination, General Marshall lost interest in it. He began to watch the clock rather regularly and stated that he had some meeting which he was forced to attend. It was with important representatives of foreign countries.
"When we left his office, I realized that the `brush-off' technique had been applied; that a great part of the time had been consumed by Marshall in reading meaningless correspondence, and all for a purpose. [p.51]. . . .
"As a witness, Short was the exact opposite of Marshall. Both men have very keen intellects and quick minds. Marshall had employed his to evade direct questions and to give the Board only such information as he wanted it to have. Short testified readily [p.64]. . . .
"Why Marshall went as far as he did without telling the Board the entire truth remains a mystery. [p.93]. . . .
"Intercepted Japanese messages had been withheld from the Board by the War Department and I could see but one reason, to wit: Marshall and his close associates on the General Staff did not want the Army Pearl Harbor Board to know that they were in possession of so much important information, none of which had been sent to Short on the Islands. [p.98]. . . .
Marshall's Second Appearance as a Witness before the APHB
"The reappearance of General Marshall before the Board as a witness resulted from testimony given by Admiral Kimmel [the...Read more›

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In 1944 Major-General Henry Dozier Russell was appointed to the United States Army Pearl Harbor Investigation Board. Their assignment was to discover how the attack on Pearl Harbor could have taken place without US knowledge. The results of that investigation are widely known. And while the Board's conclusions fell most harshly on General George C. Marshall, there were many others who would share responsiblity in this infamous event.Written between 1944 and 1946 and stored in a vault until the mid-1990's, this memoir reveals Russell's thoughts, concerns, and unique perspective on one of the darkest moments in US history: the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.Quotes from the Memoir:"I doubt if at any critical time in our history our interests were in the hands of a weaker group of men than those constituting the War Department in December 1941.""The conduct of the War Department from the evening of December 6, 1941, until the time of the attack reflects a state of inefficiency which is so amazing that its description would not be believed were it not so completely established.""We knew early Sunday morning that war would come at one o'clock that day, but nothing was done. The War Department was enjoying its weekend of leisure and this could not be distrubed by a little Japanese war. What a sorry picture!"

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Pearl Harbor Recalled: New Images of the Day of Infamy Review

Pearl Harbor Recalled: New Images of the Day of Infamy
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Pearl Harbor Recalled with text by James P. Delgado and illustrations by Tom Freeman places the attack in a new perspective. In place of multiple poor quality black and white prints which is all we have to envision the Day of Infamy, Tom Freeman has supplied a visually stunning chronology of the attack beginning with aerial views of the harbor as the attack commenced and ending with a beatiful view of the battleship Arizona as she lies today in the mud of Pearl Harbor. Each episode in the drama is portrayed from the sailing of the Kido Butai (First Striking Force) to the launching of the midget submarines to the first skirmish with the latter and Tone's scout plane confirming the presence of the fleet in harbor. Freeman then potrays the assaults on US airfields preventing any air opposition and then the smashing of battleship row, culminating with a breathtaking portrayal of the Arizona blowing up at approximately 810 am. Individual heroics are portrayed with one G.I. firing his .45 caliber pistol at an A6M Zero as it races close overhead and firemen putting out fires at Hickam Field.
The vast expanse of the fiery inferno is vividly portrayed and places the attack on Pearl Harbor in the world of color for I believe the first time. If not the first, then it is certainly the best artistic impression made of the attack, well researched and executed. Mr. Delgado's narrative is informative and complements the paintings extremely well. This is an excellent book which I would recommend to any naval student, wargamer or naval historian.

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Pearl Harbor: Japan's Fatal Blunder : The True Story Behind Japan's Attack on December 7, 1941 Review

Pearl Harbor: Japan's Fatal Blunder : The True Story Behind Japan's Attack on December 7, 1941
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One of the major problems with this book is hinted at by the mixed messages on the cover. I found it (in a library) shelved under nonfiction, history of WWII while the back cover copy describes it as a 'novel'. The confusion is understandable. Albright begins with real historical events (the Russo-Japanese War, and the early stages of the Pearl Harbor attack) although in a superficial and novelized format. Then at the point where the Japanese attack in reality broke off and went home, Albright postulates further assaults both in the air and on the surface. Unfortunately, the left turn into alternate history isn't all that well marked. I spent quite a bit of time after the shift into fiction wondering if Albright had his facts wrong or if my previous reading on the subject had missed something.
The author information in the hardcover edition mentions that Albright, then a serving Army officer, was present at the Pearl Harbor attack. While this credential commands respect for him personally, it is of little help to him as a novelist. Since (past a certain point) the book is fiction, it demands the fiction writer's craft of drawing readers into the story. While Albright uses the tools of fiction -- directly quoted dialog, physical description of characters with speaking parts -- they aren't really handled adeptly. His idea might well have been better served by an essay format without the foray into fiction.
(Another problem, one in no way Albright's fault, is that in the years since his book appeared "alternate history" has become a lively fictional genre populated by talented storytellers such as Harry Turtledove. The genre has developed smooth methods of handling narrative problems -- such as conveying the real history, the alternate history, and the point where the two diverge, to readers all without tedious lectures -- which Albright was trying to solve entirely on his own. This unfortunately means that although alternate-history buffs would be the ideal audience for this work, they are also the audience most likely to judge it harshly.)
Unfortunately this book falls between two stools -- it's not quite a historical account of Pearl Harbor, and not quite a what-if novel on the same subject.

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The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (with Animated CD) Review

The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (with Animated CD)
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Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis book "The Attack on Pearl Harbor" is an excellent source of information and photos about the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet on Dec 7, 1941. This book is full of specific details about almost all of the people, equipment, and major leaders who were involved in this battle. It is easy to follow and is well written. While not a lengthy read (about 120 pages), it is packed full of relevant and specific stories from topics a varied as the Japanese special attack force, through the destruction of the Battleship Row, to the present day memorials to the USS Arizona and USS Utah. It is easy to recommend this book to anyone interested in what was one of the darkest days in American history.

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Pearl Harbor: Mother of All Conspiracies Review

Pearl Harbor: Mother of All Conspiracies
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The author has done an excellent job of explaining himself. There is so much information presented in this book that people who get bogged down in minutae may never finish the book!
I own many of the books cited by the author. His quotes are correct. His conclusions are good too! Some reviewers have become all tangled up in the Japanese Naval Codes and when were they broken. The offical documents do not mean that much to me. The reason these offical documents fail to interest me very much is because I have another book that I do not believe the author has!
Radio Magazine, May 1941. This is a little booklet type of magazine popular in the 1930's and 40's. It is geared for the radio hobbiest. Back then, radio was still new and millions of people enjoyed building their own radios from parts or even kits. This magazine was for the people to read, learn, and discuss topics of interest. In this issue is an article showing the home hobbiest how to listen to the Japanese coded transmissions at home. It teaches you how to understand the codes and it even shows you how to break the Japanese Navy Codes at home. So to me much of the arguement over when could our Navy read the Japanese Codes becomes irrelavent with the solution published in a hobby magazine seven months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Regarding the question: Did they use their radios on the way to Pearl Harbor; the answer is a resounding YES! They had to!
The Japanese Navy took a northern route just below the Alutian Islands then turned south to Pearl Harbor. During the third week of November this large convoy was hit by a severe winter storm. These big storms are common in the northern Pacific this time of year.
The Japanese convoy was scattered over a huge area of the Pacific Ocean. The commanders had to use radio to form up their convoy again. When ships are thiry and sixty miles away it is not possible to signal them by semephore (signal flags). Radio was the way it had to be done. And yes indeed our West Coast radio amatuers were listneing closely as the Japanese convoy found one ship after another. It was quite time consuming and once the ships gathered around they had to sail into a protective formation taking even more time.
Station CAST knew this convoy was coming when small groups began meeting outside several Navy bases and then sailed at random up to the very northern Japanese Islands. Then the time came to sail east. Station CAST was in Corrigador Island. This is why the men and files were smuggled out by PT boat and submarine. These men knew too much to let them be prisoners.
As you read more about Pearl Harbor you will also want Stinnets book: Day of Deciet. These two books go hand in hand and both are available at Amazon.
Whatever you do read! Let it be a passion in you. Learn and love to learn. Never stop regardless of your age. Some of the Pearl Harbor books are written with a liberal slant. It is too bad because I like a book without a political slant. There are enough politics involved when author Stinnet tries and tries to get informatiom through the Freedom of Information Act. An American law to keep govt records open. The unexpected part of this FOIA is to de-classify SECRET documents.
Some authors such a Stinnet have done very well with this, Willey has not done as well. However, Willey has done very well in planting the reading and learning seed in others. Willey helps the student of history learn what it means to be hungry for information. Be sure to Read Willey's book along with Stinnets book. You will have fun for sure! George Morgenstern write an excellent book and never forget Crocker's book : Roosevelt's Red Road to Russia. There are about eight or ten books to read that will shatter your thoughts of how it was. Now you graduate into a small group who know. Harry Elmer Barnes wrote several books and edited one named after a phrase he (Beard) coined himself. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace. This is a group of eight authors driven to tell the truth just like Stinnett and Morgenstern did. A chapter in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace deals with George Orwells 1984. This is the real back story for the book or movie. If you read this then the rest you read will fall into place. No more confusion taking place. As you read more you learn that the conspiracy is put forth by our govt, and the anti-dote is given by folks like Wiley who are quiet, sincere information sources. When thinking of Pearl Harbor it is fair to ask yourself ........... why in the world are any Pearl Harbor papers still marked secret after 67 years? Read! Read more! Have fun and fill your mind with thoughts! Travel to far away countries in your mind. Have fun and never leave your couch!!!

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"Everything you know about Pearl Harbor is wrong." This definitive book proves the United States read the main Japanese fleet code JN-25 prior to Pearl Harbor and that Washington knew Pearl Harbor was to be attacked. It reveals for the first time several of the deepest secrets of World War II.

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Day of Deceit : The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor Review

Day of Deceit : The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor
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Day of Deceit is a well documented account of the Roosevelt administration's efforts to provoke the Japanese into attacking the US to have an excuse to enter the war against Germany. No progressive democrat or reactionary republican can give this text an honest reading without coming to the conclusion that the Roosevelt administration, rather than being a reluctant entrant into the war, was an enthusiastic and very active provocateur.
If the propositions of this text were not true, no WWII archives would still be secret.

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Attack on Pearl Harbor: A Pictorial History Review

Attack on Pearl Harbor: A Pictorial History
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This book at the list price is an unbelieveable value considering the never before seen photos and documentation of the Island of Oahu and its many military installations. There are photos of Pearl prior to the attack, during the attack and after the attack including interesting salvage photos. Also included are eyewitness accounts of young sailors.. There is also a chapter devoted to photos from the Japanese perspective. This book was formerly published as "East Wind Rain." This book is a definite must have..

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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Review

Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History
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Over the years, there has developed a "revisionist" group of historians who claimed FDR Knew in advance about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor and he did nothing to stop it. In this excellent book by Gordon Prange, this somewhat questionable viewpoint is thoroughly destroyed. One of the revisionists' claims is that the radio stations on the West Coast were able to track the Japanese fleet due to their radio signals. This is impossible, since the Japanese fleet NEVER broke radio silence, and, in fact, had their transmitters removed from thier radios all together. Mitsuo Fuchida, the pilot who led the attack, also said that "the force maintained the strictest radio silence throughout the cruise". Revisionists also believed, according to Prange, that if the Japanese task force would have been discovered, it would have turned back. Again, this is not true. The Japanese hoped to attain surprise, but if they were to have been discovered, they were prepared to fight all the way to Pearl Harbor to deliver their attack. What Prange attempts to achieve in this excellent book is who really was to blame? In this aspect, the War Department and the commanders, Kimmel and Short, are held responsible. Prange comes down hard on the War Department for failing to notify the commanders of the intercepted "bomb plot" message. This message, intercepted by "Magic", was transmitted to Japan by a Japanese spy. It broke Pearl Harbor into several sections, which, in effect, could be interpreted as a bombing grid. This information was not transmitted to Kimmel and Short, and could have proven invaluable. But the bulk of the blame appears to fall on Kimmel, Short, and the subordinate commanders. Kimmel and Short both grossly misinterpreted the "War Warning" message dated November 27, 1941, and sent to them by Washington. Short only alerted his troops against possible sabotage and maintained his training schedule. The War Department is also to blame here, because they failed to follow up to make sure Short understood the meaning of the message. Kimmel also failed to grasp the meaning of this message, and, unfortunately, communication between the army and navy was poor at best, so very little information was shared between the commands. One must also realize, and Prange makes excellent reference to this in the book, is that the Japanese placed tremendous amounts of time, thought, and training into this mission, and they must be credited with the success of the attack. America's belief of their huge superiority in both ships and personnel was totally destroyed. Prange also covers each of the resulting investigations fully and includes excellent testimony throughout the book. In summary, this is an excellent book about the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and does a good job of refuting the revisionists and acurately placing blame.

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Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor Review

Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor
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. Equipped with Japanese language skills and academic experience in Japan, Dr. Stephan conducted exhaustive research into military and civilian sources in order to develop the full story of Japan's designs upon Hawaii in the early stages of WWII. His book reveals a serious intent to actually invade and occupy the islands, primarily to deny the U.S. Navy its natural springboard for challenging Japanese advances in the Pacific. The kicker in that regard was the Doolittle Raid in April 1942, which convinced the Japanese Army that Hawaii was a threat that had to be neutralized.
. A secondary goal was to liberate the "Asian" poplace of Hawaii (which to Imperial Japan was everyone there except Caucasians) and bring them into their Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some Japanese even advocated annexing Hawaii outright, as a natural extension of their own island nation.
. One surprise to this reviewer was learning the extent to which many of Hawaii's ethnic Japanese citizens directly participated in the mother country's war, at least before Pearl Harbor. Many served in the Imperial armed forces (i.e., in China) and others returned to Japan before Pearl Harbor to support the war through academic or jounalistic pursuits. There is no suggestion, though, that Japanese-Americans in Hawaii (after Pearl Harbor) engaged in any such activities.
. The book also reveals that a Japanese attempt to take and hold Hawaii was most likely doomed to failure; a potential calamity on a grand scale. By late 1942 (the proposed time frame for the invasion) U.S. forces on Oahu alone were far superior, at least in numbers, to the proposed Japanese invasion force. Ghastly attrition of invasion troops would have been unavoidable, even if the campaign was ultimately successful. And once in control of Hawaii, Japan clearly didn't have the logistic capacity to sustain themselves there--there's no way their merchant marine could have replaced the necessary constant flow of supplies coming from the U.S. Both conquerers and conquered would have faced cruel deprivation in a few short months.
. Clearly, Hawaii would have been Japan's "Bridge Too Far." Everyone--Japanese, Hawaiians, and other Americans--were far better off because the Battle of Midway put an abrupt end to the whole idea.
. In summary, this is a fascinating topic that will hold the interest of any serious student of WWII in the Pacific. Dr. Stephan's treatment of it is highly detailed, thoroughly researched, and presented in a manner that holds the reader's interest from cover to cover.

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From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Review

From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States
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I've read virtually every English-language book on the subject of the history of Japanese militarism and history from Perry through World War II. Had I another life or more time, I would do a PhD on the topic, as it fascinates me deeply. Thus, I greatly anticipated this book, and, despite my low rating (3/5) treasure it as an important part of my collection. Prof. Asada has truly done the world a great service by writing this book, as, if nothing else, it can be used as a stepping stone for futher clarification and thought on the basic question of "why did Japan initiate World War II in the Pacific?" I thank Prof Asada deeply from his work, and apologize to him that my review in the following will be a bit harsh.
Basically, while book itself is full of "facts", it is a monumentally dull read, even for a person fascinated by the subject as I am. I literally have used this book as a sleeping aid. The details of the various naval limitation treaty conferences are hashed and rehashed ad nauseum, and the littlest tweaks in IJN strategic doctrine are hashed and rehashed ad nausuem. This, in and of itself, however, is not damning.
The problem is that I feel like I am too often presented with a mountainfull of historical facts but a teacup of insight. For example, one of the major themes of the book is the question of treaty limits - would the Japanese get 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, or 70% of the US tonnage limit? Apparently the debates on the exact number were enough to have made Japanese officers cry, protest, resign, un-resign, declare that they had been mortally wronged, etc. We are presented of the details of who wanted what number and when, and why they changed their opinions and views, but none of this really ever gets to the heart of the matter.
There is no attempt at (for lack of a better term) psychoanalysis of either indivuals or groups to really make us understand, at a really deep level, WHY.
For a while, I thought that this was because the author was content to play the dispassionate historian. But, with time, the actual reason for this blase treatment became obvious. It's basically the same reason that the book stops at Pearl Harbor: the author, if not an Emperor and Japan apologist, takes great pains to NOT provide any analysis since such analysis would be offensive to Japanese readers.
Remember, this guy is a senior professor Emeritus at a Japanese university. Perhaps the analysis itself is too hard for the author to do for personal reasons? Perhaps, if he is intellectually honest, given where he is in life, he is waiting for an eager student to build upon his base and do what he could not, for reasons of political correctness?
(This is why it gets 3 stars, not 4), the author quite unfairly cherry-picks sources and believes third-hand quotes that make the Showa Emperor (Hirohito) come off smelling like a rose. There is no attempt to refute other historians who have presented far more compelling cases for the Emperor's complicity. Prof. Asasa does not attempt serious source analysis - the rest of us have very good reason to understand why somebody, writing, for example, in the 1940s or 1950s would feel compelled to write in their memoirs things that protected the Emperor. Often, such writings are recollected quotations that contrast sharply with the historical record elsewhere. No attempt is made to analyze such emperor-defending sources. Rather, they are taken as gospel and then lofty and overbroad conclusions of the Emperor's innocence are made.
I do not speak Japanese so well, though perhaps with a little bit of study it would get much better. Therefore, as a specialist 'amateur' I dig deeply into whatever translated sources on the matter I can find. Often, this means the occasional rare translated book that can be found, for example, at the bookshop of the little museum near Yasukuni. Such books enjoy english readership probably in the hundreds, but they allow people like me a rare glimpse into what the Japanese are saying about their own history. Yes, Yasukuni Jinja is in some ways a right-wing haven, but what to be said when a book about an ostensibly neutral topic such as, say, Saburo Sakai (a famous IJN ace), has paranthetical comments hinting at the nobility of the Japanese cause?
Certainly Prof. Asada's book is far too intelligent and mature to go off into tangents about the reality of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere (even if that concept were in the ken of the book, which it is not). However, "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" in some sense represents the high end of the Japanese millieu of writing on the war (and of course I am exclusing the writings of firebrands like Ienaga Saburo) - that is to say, it's still full of rationalizations, apologetics, and, obfuscatory-through-overdetail.
Prof Asada, you painted a wonderful picture of trees. It's the forest that you missed.
For the reader: worth reading if you are interested in the topic. However, don't let the scholarly approach lull you or overwhelm you into forgetting that this book is guilty of large errors of omission.


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Who Was Responsible? From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor Review

Who Was Responsible From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor
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The media has been ignoring it, the government avoiding it, and the right wing denying it. Individual WWII veteran who confessed his experience in war had been sue and trial in court (e.g. The famous To Shiro case, 1997). But finally, the most influential News media in Japan has come fore and done its duty, as a responsible media should - reporting the truth. The book is a bit dry but never the less, informative.
We need openness, sincerity, and courage to heal old wounds. Hope to see more of that coming from the Japanese government.


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The Liberty Letters: Personal Correspondence of Catherine Clark and Meredith Lyons: Pearl Harbor, 1941 Review

The Liberty Letters: Personal Correspondence of Catherine Clark and Meredith Lyons: Pearl Harbor, 1941
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The Liberty Letters: Personal Correspondence of Catherine Clark and Meredith Lyons: Pearl Harbor, 1941- was a really good book. I enjoyed it alot. I learned about how The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. And about polio because one of the girls brothers has it.
I liked the book and might read another by Nancy LeSound.
Rachael

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The USS Arizona: The Ship, the Men, the Pearl Harbor Attack, and the Symbol That Aroused America Review

The USS Arizona: The Ship, the Men, the Pearl Harbor Attack, and the Symbol That Aroused America
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I purchased this book as a gift for an uncle who was an ARIZONA survivor who had preceeded me in my Naval career. He survived to serve twenty more years in the Navy after the sinking of his ship, including surviving having another ship sunk beneath him. Unfortunately he died before I had the chance to give it to him--though prehaps not so unfortunate in one respect. He was a stickler for details and he would probably have been disappointed in the story of his ship as told in this book.
The book is a dramatic story of a dramatic event that shaped world history. Having said that, there's not much else to say about it. It is the result of collaboration by three authors, one of whom is a retired U.S. Marine. It reads as though they each took one part of the story to write and the book was hurriedly cobbled together to meet a publishing deadline without adequate reconciliation of the different parts. Other than the personal accounts of the individual survivors quoted, I can find little new material in the book that isn't published elsewhere. I was disappointed in the inconsistant data in the books--such as calling ADM H.E. Kimmel an Admiral (4 stars), a Rear Admiral (2 stars) and a Fleet Admiral (5 stars) in the space of a page and a half. That part was obviously not written by the Marine, who would never make such a mistake in rank. There was also a discription of one of the surviors who, also in the space of a couple of pages was referred to as a "chief warrant officer", a "warrant officer" and "eligible for warrant officer" (a chief petty officer). Other similarly discordant data jangled the attention of a reader. Nautical terminology was sometimes used, sometimes misused, sometimes disregarded entirely. Many of the scenes were decribed repetatively and inconsistantly, not just from the different viewpoints of the different survivors but from the narative matrix connecting the stories. Details about the ship and the people were erratic and kept the reader off balance, trying to construct a picture of the events. The pace and feel of the book was inconsistant throughout and not of the caliber I'd have expected of a book recording events from the perspective of sixty years later.

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